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a social interaction, this improved visual 
discrimination and detection of biological 
motion (Neri et al., 2006; Manera et al., 
2011). This “inverse relationship” between 
bottom-up perceptual input and top-down 
social information implies the presence of 
“social” forward (internally generated) 
models acting as top-down priors, which 
may be competing with other internal 
models for overall control, comparable to 
forward models of action (Wolpert and 
Miall, 1996).
In accordance with this body of work, 
it would be legitimate to argue that either 
the evolution of at least some social cog-
nitive processes such as “theory of mind” 
emerged through “cooptation” of predic-
tive mechanisms or vice versa, as selec-
tion pressures on sophisticated abilities 
to predict and manipulate the behavior of 
con-specifics increased in early hominid 
environments that became more heavily 
reliant on social cooperation. The modu-
lation of predictive mechanisms by social 
context could be explained by a prioritized 
attentional orientation toward social infor-
mation (Driver et al., 1999), which would 
likely have had some adaptive evolutionary 
benefits. The increasing complexity of the 
social environment in primates and humans 
may have consequently had an impact on 
the development of fundamental predic-
tive mechanisms, and therefore recruiting 
previously non-social cognitions and neu-
ral structures for social predictive functions. 
This notion could also be supported by the 
substantial overlap seen between brain areas 
implicated in the “predictive brain” (Bubic 
et al., 2010) and the “social brain” (Abu-
Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). These 
suggestions are compatible with the social 
brain hypothesis (Brothers, 1990; Dunbar, 
1998). Indeed, Sallet et al. (2011) have 
recently shown that social network size and 
social status is correlated with gray  matter 
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Clark’s (in press) paper gives us an adept 
introduction into the potential for the con-
cept of the predictive brain to provide us 
with an integrative and unifying framework 
to explain cognition. Indeed, this raises an 
abundance of new questions for possible 
future work to address. It also highlights 
the necessity for much gap-filling that will 
arise through the inevitable application of 
these principles to different aspects of cog-
nition, as the breadth of the promise of the 
predictive brain in explaining neural and 
psychological phenomena becomes wider. 
Clark touches on some possible expan-
sions of the predictive brain into the realm 
of social neuroscience. In this commentary, 
the relatively new hypothesis of the “social 
predictive brain” is presented. We argue that 
there is already a large body of empirical 
and theoretical neuroscientific work from 
neurophysiological, behavioral, and com-
putational perspectives that provide sub-
stantial evidence for a fundamental role for 
predictive mechanisms in the processing of 
social information and in social interaction. 
Further to this, we propose that the evolu-
tion of social cognitive processes, or in other 
words, the evolution of the social brain, has 
been built upon the increasing complexity 
of the predictive mechanisms of perception, 
action, and learning, which Clark outlines 
in his paper.
To successfully interact with others, we 
must be able to interpret and understand 
others’ behavior, and this often involves 
predicting their cognitive and emotional 
mental states. It is likely that this is largely 
formed from our own perceptual and 
motor experiences and facilitated by the 
expectations acquired from previous social 
experience. In recent years, more empirical 
work has confirmed the existence of shared 
neural representations in social interaction, 
in that similar patterns of neural activity 
are recruited during one’s own experience 
and when observing others. In particular, 
the processing involved in the observation 
of others’ actions (Gallese et al., 1996), 
rewards (Ma et al., 2011), errors (van Schie 
et al., 2004), pain (Cheng et al., 2008), and 
fear (Mineka and Cook, 1993) is con-
ceived through predictive mechanisms in 
both first-person and third-person experi-
ence. It is thought that these shared neu-
ral representations may form the neural 
basis for understanding the mental states 
of others. Predictive coding models of the 
mirror neuron system (Kilner et al., 2007) 
and the MOSAIC model of social interac-
tion (Wolpert et al., 2003) are pertinent 
examples of the central role of predictive 
mechanisms and Bayesian inference in 
social interactive processes. Behrens et al. 
(2008) proposes the presence of a “social 
prediction error” during social valuation, 
and Heyes (2011) compellingly argues that 
social learning involves the same mecha-
nisms as non-social learning, which may 
also apply to social decision-making (e.g., 
Yoshida et al., 2010). Expectancy violations 
in social contexts may be represented by 
a similar prediction error as that coding 
for the discrepancy between one’s own 
expectation and experience, such as in 
social deviance and the breaking of social 
norms (Harris and Fiske, 2010; Kim et al., 
2011). Other evidence that suggests a fun-
damental role for predictive mechanisms 
in social interactive cognitive processes 
comes from work demonstrating a direct 
modulatory effect of social context and 
social information on low level perceptual 
and sensorimotor processing. For exam-
ple, when participants were engaged in 
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volume in the superior temporal cortex 
and rostral prefrontal cortex in macaques. 
As an alternative account, which is at least 
equally complimentary to our proposal 
of the predictive social brain (Brown and 
Brüne, 2012), Barton (2012) convincingly 
demonstrates the benefit of using cerebellar 
neuron number as a more appropriate index 
of cognitive evolution, and consequently the 
evolution of social intelligence, as opposed 
to the more commonly used index of neo-
cortex volume and neuron number. He also 
points to the work identifying the cerebel-
lum as the source of predictive internal 
(forward) models of action (Wolpert et al., 
1998), which have been extended to action 
understanding and action prediction in 
social interaction (Wolpert et al., 2003). 
One hypothesis of the evolution of the pre-
dictive social brain would be that the brain 
areas involved in predictive processing of 
social information are also shaped by the 
complexity of the social environment.
As the validity of the Bayesian/predictive 
brain hypothesis further gets put to the test 
in different realms of cognitive science, we 
will begin to reveal the ability to general-
ize these principles to other cognitive and 
psychological phenomena. However, it may 
be the case that we have already made sub-
stantial headway in confirming the potential 
breadth of applying such principles, at least 
in social neuroscience (Brown and Brüne, 
2012). Therefore, it would be of value to take 
stock of what existing evidence from social 
neuroscience lends compatibility with the 
concept of the predictive brain, and how the 
implications from this work might impact 
on current standpoints on the evolution of 
the social brain.
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